Trade union revitalization in Kenya: acquisition and utilization of power resources by Omolo, Jacob




Trade Union Revitalization in Kenya: Acquisition and Utilization of Power Resources  
 
Jacob Omolo£  
Abstract 
A consensus has emerged in trade union research that trade unions are not solely at the mercy of 
major societal trends, but always have the option of making strategic choice(s) to revitalize and 
ensure improvement in the socio-economic welfare of their members. The key question is, which 
power resources and means of exerting such power are available to trade unions in the different 
context they face to reposition and revitalize themselves?  This paper uses the power resources 
approach to identify the power resources that were acquired, developed and utilized by the 
Kenya National Private Security Workers Union to revitalize. The revitalization process, which 
started in 2011 saw the union transform from an outfit characterized by leadership wrangles, 
coup d’états, demarcation conflicts and low membership density to one with relatively high 
membership, stronger cohesion and solidarity, and unity amongst the leadership and the rank and 
file members. Based on the analysis, the revitalization of the Kenya National Private Security 
Workers Union reinforced the fact that associational power is best sustained through institutional 
power. The revitalization process also saw a double framing function by allowing the union to 
gain more sympathy and relevance from members of the public, while internally presenting it 
with articulation capabilities to bring together national officials, shop stewards and rank-and-file 
members. These changes made the union to increase its density by almost tenfold between 2011 
and 2017. It also enabled the union to emerge as a strong, cohesive and vibrant union capable of 
turning challenges into opportunities.   
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The role of security as an anchor of good governance, social welfare and economic development 
cannot be gainsaid. Security is key to achieving rapid and sustained economic growth, national 
productivity and competitiveness, and the socio-economic and political transformations that 
Kenya aspires to (Republic of Kenya, 2007). The private security industry in Kenya has grown in 
size and importance, particularly since 2009 when Kenya started to become a target of terror 
groups, especially Somali Islamist extremists, due to its international engagement in the 
restoration of security in Somalia. 
 
Kenya has a large and growing private security industry, with employment level estimated at 
over 500,000 employees and 2,000 registered companies. Majority of the private security 
companies are local with only five being multinational.16 The industry has a burgeoning informal 
economy characterized by individual companies that are neither duly registered nor operate from 
a recognized physical address. The private security industry is also characterized by triangular 
forms of employment such as labour brokerage, subcontracting and outsourcing. Kenya’s private 
security market is segmented, pitting big, medium, small and micro-sized firms against each 
other. While subcontracting, labour brokerage and outsourcing are manifestations of atypical 
forms of employment, the private security firms use the segmented market structure to undercut 
others and bid down costs, especially workers’ wages. These practices increase the vulnerability 
of private security industry employees.    
 
A constant issue in Kenya’s private security industry since 1960 has been the ineffective 
organization and representation of industry employees with regard to their trade union and 
collective bargaining rights. Industry employees have suffered weak representation manifested in 
multiple trade unions within the sector; leadership wrangles; coup d’états in union leadership; 
and demarcation conflicts in regard to union membership organizational boundaries.  
 
As a consequence, working conditions in the sector deteriorated: at one point, most private 
security guards earned basic wages as low as US$ 37 a month. This was about one-third of the 
legislated minimum wage of approximately US$ 11017 as of 2016 (Republic of Kenya, 2016). 
Guards work for an average of 71 hours per week, contrary to 52 hours provided for in the 
Regulation of Wages (Protective Security Services) Order of 1998 as amended by Legal Notice 
No. 53 of 2003 (Omolo, 2015). Although the Wages Order provides for payment of overtime for 
extra hours worked, most of the industry employers do not comply (Omolo, 2015). A majority of 
private security guards also access their annual leave entitlements through off-days and not 
actual leave days. This is contrary to Section 28(3) of the Employment Act (2007), which require 
that part of the annual leave taken by an employee should consist of at least two uninterrupted 
working weeks. Maternity, paternity and sick leaves are also severely restricted (Omolo, 2015), 
contrary to the provisions of Sections 28, 29 and 30 of the Employment Act (2007). All these 
constitute major violations of the fundamental principles and rights of workers, and created a 
strategic issue for union transformation and revitalization. 
 
                                                             
16 These include Bob Morgan Services Ltd; G4S Security Services (K) Ltd; KK Security Ltd; Securex Agencies (K) 
Ltd; and Security Group of Companies Ltd.  
17 Exchange rate as of September 2016. 




The year 2011 marked a turnaround for the private security industry employees in Kenya. The 
turnaround was mainly attributed to the strategic acquisition, development and utilization of 
power resources by the Kenya National Private Security Workers’ Union (KNPSWU). This case 
study explores the power resources and capabilities that the KNPSWU acquired and developed, 
and how they have been used to build the union and improve the welfare of its members.  
 
Power Resources Approach 
Labour revitalization studies emphasize the ability of trade unions to act strategically (Voss and 
Sherman, 2000; Frege and Kelly, 2004; Turner, 2006; Chun, 2009; and Lévesque and Murray, 
2013). Critical to this line of thinking is the question as to which possible actions and means of 
exerting power the trade unions have available to them in the different contexts they face to 
reposition and revitalize themselves as organisations. 
 
The power resources approach is based on the premise that workers, inclusive of their trade 
unions can successfully defend their interests by collective mobilisation of power resources. 
Power, in this context, mean every opportunity within a social relationship to assert one’s own 
will, even in the face of resistance (Weber, 1968). The concepts of structural and associational 
power developed by Erik Olin Wright and Beverly Silver (Wright, 2000; Silver, 2003) provide 
the anchor to the power resources approach. Institutional and social power have since been added 
through ensuing debates and academic discourses (McGuire, 2014).  
 
McGuire (2014) quoting Dorne, Holst and Nachtwey (2009) explains that structural power rests 
on the power of the trade union to cause disruption. It is exercised in terms of workplace 
bargaining power and market place bargaining power. According to McGuire (2014), 
associational power arises from the solidarity and collective action of workers while the 
institutional power is the outcome of struggles and negotiations based on structural and 
associational power. The social power is the latitudes for action enjoyed by the union arising 
from networks and partnerships between the union and other actors (McGuire, 2014).  
 
Lévesque and Murray (2010) contend that power resources alone are not enough. According to 
the authors, trade unions must have the capability to recognize and use power resources 
strategically to their advantage. Lévesque and Murray (2010) identify intermediating, framing, 
articulating and learning as the strategic capabilities that are critical in the mobilization of union 
power resources. Though not advanced by Lévesque and Murray (2010), scholars have 
separately argued in favour of organizational flexibility as another capability.  
 
A major gap in the power resources approach, however, is its predominant application to explain 
and anchor the experiences of the Global North. Only isolated cases of application of the 
approach can be cited in the processes in the Global South (Webster and Ludwig, 2017). It is this 
void that this study seeks to fill using the case of the KNPSWU. The sections that follow detail 
the initial situation of the union before the transformation, the power resources and capabilities 








The Initial Situation 
The KNPSWU was founded in 1960 as the Night Watchmen Union. The broad mandate of the 
union is to secure, promote and protect the fundamental principles and rights of private security 
guards in Kenya. For about 51 years of its history, the union’s operations were marked by 
splinters, leadership wrangles degenerating to coup d’états, and mergers punctuated with massive 
membership withdrawals.  
The very first splinter experienced by the union was in its founding year. This culminated in 
about six trade unions organizing guards in the private security industry in Kenya. The desire to 
strengthen trade union representation in the industry generated the need for a merger of the six 
unions. This was realized in 1965 through the formation of the Kenya Union of Commercial 
Food and Allied Workers (KUCFAW). However, 34 years later in 1999, the union experienced a 
more serious challenge of massive membership withdrawal. The membership withdrawals 
triggered formation of a new splinter union, the Kenya Guards and Allied Workers’ Union 
(KEGAWU). Leadership wrangles persisted in the union such that between 1999 and 2006, 
KEGAWU had a record 13 leadership coups bringing in an equivalent number of general 
secretaries at the helm of the union. This meant that each of the general secretaries led the union 
for barely six months. The challenges experienced by the union led to the birth of a new splinter 
union in 2006, the Union of Diplomatic International Private and Allied Security Officers of 
Kenya (UDIPAS). The life of UDIPAS was, however, short-lived as it merged with KEGAWU 
in July 2007 to form the KNPSWU, which also experienced some leadership conflict between 
2007 and 2011 but successfully weathered it.  
It may be safe to argue that the turbulence in the private security industry unions was mainly 
attributed to perceptions of ineffective representation; loss of confidence in the union leadership 
by the rank-and-file members; and the desire to have a guards’ union that is owned, led and run 
by guards themselves and not outsiders. As would be predicted, the aforementioned issues led to 
serious difficulties in union membership organization and recruitment. The union membership 
plummeted to a low of 327 by 2011 compared to a potential of 30,000, implying a union density 
of about one per cent. Also, despite the poor terms and conditions of employment for the guards, 
the union had not entered into any collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with industry 
employers.18 This meant that the guards had to continue relying on the statutory minimum wages 
and terms and conditions of employment prescribed by the government. Besides being severely 
low, the regulations on wages and conditions of employment are hardly enforced by the 
government, and weakly complied with by industry employers. The low level of enforcement is 
mainly due to weak capacity of the ministry responsible for labour matters; high levels of 
unemployment and poverty; and other structural problems in Kenya.   
 
 
                                                             
18 In Kenya, trade unions and employer(s) must sign a recognition agreement before undertaking collective bargaining. A 
recognition agreement is a legally binding agreement between a trade union and an employer or group of employers, which 
grants the union the legal mandate and legitimacy to represent the unionisable employees of the firm in all matters relating to 
their terms and conditions of employment. It is entered into when the union has recruited into its membership a simple majority 
(50%+1) of the unionisable employees of the firm(s) in question.   




Union Revitalization and Utilization of Power Resources 
Three key success stories can be gathered from the KNPSWU experience. These are massive 
growth in union membership; the ability to build internal cohesion and solidarity; and the gaining 
of and strategic utilization of institutional power. More details on these successes and the 
processes behind them follow in the sections that follow.  
Building union membership and cohesion through associational power  
The KNPSWU experienced massive membership growth since 2011. The membership rose from 
a paltry 327 in 2011 to 500 in 2012. Thereafter, it shot to 36,267 in 2015, 45,000 in 2016 and 
50,000 in 2017. The union density, therefore, increased by tenfold from one per cent in 2011 to 
10 per cent in 2017 based on an estimated employment level of 30,000 and 500,000 in 2011 and 
2017, respectively. According to the general secretary of the union, the revealed membership is a 
conservative figure that only considers members of the union that are remitting monthly 
subscription fees on a regular basis and those actively involved in the institutional capacity 
building activities of the union. Such activities include attending meetings, training, and 
lobbying and advocacy campaigns. The reported membership figure does not include those who 
do not pay union subscription dues on a regular basis and those who are passive in terms of 
participation in trade union meetings and campaigns.  
 
About one third of the union members are female, supporting the argument that the security 
sector is increasingly moving away from the traditional masculine orientation, and that women 
are breaking the occupational segregation barriers to enter into the hitherto male-dominated 
occupations. This may be as a result of modernization of the security industry, high levels of 
unemployment, and integration of the community, all allowing more women to participate in the 
security sector. 
 
The informal sector accounts for a fairly low proportion of the union membership, estimated at 
less than five per cent. This means that upwards of 95 per cent of the members of KNPSWU are 
drawn from the large, medium and small private security firms in the formal sector. Interviews 
with the general secretary and the leadership of KNPSWU revealed that the union had made a 
strategic choice to focus on organizing and recruiting workers from the formal sector-based 
private security firms first. The leaders reasoned that, unlike the informal sector firms, the formal 
private security firms at least have a framework to allow for some level of compliance with the 
country’s laws and regulations. The union, therefore, envisaged fewer difficulties in sensitizing 
the firms about the fundamental principles and rights of the workers with regard to freedom of 
association. The union thus wanted to ride on this advantage, recruit the workers in these firms 
and use it to showcase to the workers in the informal sector.   
 
One of the power resources that the KNPSWU effectively utilized to build and strengthen its 
membership base is associational power. The strategy was executed through organizational 
flexibility by restructuring the branch network; designing and communicating a rallying 
membership organization and recruitment campaign message; and empowering union members 
and establishing workplace committees.  
 
 




Organizational flexibility and membership empowerment 
The KNPSWU inherited a structure with more than 13 branches. According to union officials, 
establishment of the branches was neither informed by strategic analysis nor actual or potential 
union membership at the branches, but had more to do with political expediency. The lack of 
strategic analysis in branch establishment rendered the branch network financially unsustainable. 
To address this anomaly, the new leadership de-registered all the union branches and restructured 
them into seven with clear operational and geographical boundaries. The new branches were in 
the cities and major towns in Kenya namely, Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret, Nakuru, 
Thika and Kakamega. Establishment of the branches targeted areas with high potential 
membership and greatest potential impact in service delivery to the union members.  
 
The branch restructuring also focused on the financial sustainability of the branch based on the 
number of active members therein. In so doing, the union managed to cut down on branch 
operational and administrative costs and dedicate many more resources to support the operations 
of the remaining branches. This led to enhanced operational efficiency of the branches; increased 
member confidence in the organizational ability of the union; and increased visibility of the 
union at the grassroots level, with the desired effect on membership organization and 
recruitment. These measures increased the sustainability and organizational efficiency of the 
union while also seeking to enhance the empowerment of its members. 
 
One of the methods used by the union to enhance participation and empowerment of union 
members was through institutionalization of shop steward workplace committees. The strategy 
was executed by entrenching the position of shop steward in the union constitution; defining the 
term of office for shop stewards and putting in place a mechanism for their election. Other 
strategies were establishing a network of stewards; ensuring payment of monthly allowances to 
the shop stewards; and institutionalizing shop stewards training in the union training calendar. 
By 2016, the KNPSWU had about 120 elected shop stewards. Shop stewards serve for terms of 
2½ years and get monthly stipends equivalent to US$ 40 from the union to cover operational 
expenses.  
 
As would be argued by McCullum (2013), institutionalization of shop steward workplace 
committees and entrenching the position of the shop steward in the union constitution facilitated 
union members to exercise power at the local level. The organizational process executed at the 
workplace through workplace committees was reinforced by personal visits by leaders of the 
union to each of the private security companies, as well as mobilization of guards to participate 
in union meetings including processions during Labour Day celebrations.  
 
Interviews with selected shop stewards (in November 2017) revealed that they felt more 
empowered to perform their functions, especially with regard to membership recruitment and 
grievance handling. This feeling has been buttressed by the resolve of the union leadership to 
involve the shop stewards in all matters and decisions regarding their firms, including 
negotiations. As part of the union policy, no union official is allowed to visit a firm without the 
prior knowledge of the local shop steward regarding the date and objective of the visit. Also, as a 
general rule, the local shop steward must be involved in any meeting between the union officials 
and company management, including negotiations and grievance handling. This action has two 




positive effects: firstly, it gives the rank and file members more confidence about the 
representation ability of the union, and secondly, it enhances employee-employee recruitment 
strategies by shop stewards and the rank-and -file members.  
 
As a consequence, much of the membership organization and recruitment in the private security 
industry is done by the shop stewards and union members. To enhance this recruitment strategy 
and to tap into the burgeoning informal sector, the union diversified the modes of payment of 
membership subscription fees to check-off, mobile banking and direct cash payments, especially 
at the branch level where membership registers are maintained. The employee-employee 
recruitment strategy and more flexible membership subscription methods have proven useful to 
the union, mainly due to the nature of work schedules of private security guards as well as the 
widespread experience in the informal sector of employers being unwilling or unable to 
effectively operationalize a check-off. 
 
Employer-employee relations in the private security industry were generally hostile and anti-
union, meaning that guards would be dismissed, discriminated against, transferred or penalized 
because of union membership and/or involvement in union activities. This undermined the 
union’s membership organization and recruitment efforts. As part of the learning capability, the 
KNPSWU managed to obtain an order from the Employment and Labour Relations Court 
(ELRC) to prohibit any employer from victimizing and/or transferring any employee who has 
indicated their willingness to join the union on account of the employee’s union preferences. The 
union adopted this strategy in 2015 after realizing the extent of this workplace discrimination 
based on union membership. Such court orders had been obtained and successfully applied in ten 
cases in the past, including in big companies such as Lavington Security Ltd and Wells Fargo.  
 
Building unity and cohesion: the relevance of intermediation and articulation  
The dual nature of the private security industry where formal sector firms operate alongside 
informal sector firms, and the industry’s segmented market structure characterized by high, 
medium and low-end clients, means that the interests of the union members and the extent to 
which their basic needs are met under the status quo are completely at variance. To develop a 
common ground and ensure collective interest arises out of the conflicting demands, the 
KNPSWU crafted a campaign message directed at the members of the public. The message 
framed the conception that the union stands for recognition of guards as “important” members of 
the society. To the union members, it framed itself as a champion of the fundamental principles 
and rights of guards as well as a union formed, owned, run and led by private security guards 
themselves rather than outsiders. The message crafted also depicted the union as one that stands 
for reform of the private security industry.  
Messages targeted towards union membership were delivered by union officials, branch 
committee members and shop stewards during union meetings at national, regional, branch and 
shop floor levels. They were also disseminated through bulk short text messages; social media 
platforms such as Facebook; and in some cases radio and television talk shows. Messages 
addressing the general public were mainly delivered through press conferences and meetings 
organized by the union or other partners, but involving participation of other stakeholders other 
than trade unions.  





The public messages resonated well with the target, largely because of the complementary role 
private security guards play in maintaining security, especially in the face of heightened security 
threats. The messages developed and directed towards the union membership were also received 
well by guards and acted as an effective internal unifying and recruiting strategy. Specifically, 
the areas of welfare enhancement targeted by the union in their campaign strategy were core 
issues such as basic salary, working hours, overtime payment and leave entitlement. These 
rallying issues corresponded well to the real concerns of most guards given the deteriorating 
terms and conditions of employment faced by the industry workers.  
 
It can be seen, at least in the context of the KNPSWU, that this framing had a double function. 
Externally, it allowed the union to gain more sympathy and relevance from the members of the 
public. This contributed positively to the union’s lobbying and advocacy campaigns, including 
membership organization and recruitment. Internally, it presented the union with articulation 
capabilities to construct multi-level interaction and understanding between the national office 
and the guards at enterprise level.    
 
The history of trade unionism in the private security industry is marked by the multiplicity of 
unions, union rivalry and splinters, leadership wrangles, and coups. To restore its associational 
power internally, the KNPSWU had to intermediate between conflicting interests in order to 
build unity. Many of problems that had bedeviled the union since 1960 were put down to the fact 
that the union had been led by people from outside the private security sector who had never 
been guards.  
 
The union learnt vital lessons from previous power struggles. A key lesson learnt was that the 
guards wanted “their own union”- a union formed, led and run by guards. The union used this 
message to change its constitution to require anybody seeking an elective post in the union to be, 
or have been, employed in the industry. The change in the constitution effectively prohibited the 
former officials of UDIPAS and KEGAWU or any other person who is not, or has not been, 
employed as a guard from contesting an internal union election. This restriction has contributed 
to some degree of stability in the union leadership. It has also helped to consolidate membership 
of the union into a cohesive group with a clear identity.   
 
Furthermore, the union had to build unity between its former union officials. Due to leadership 
wrangles, the union had 13 general secretaries in the seven years between 1999 and 2006. It is 
noted that formation of KNPSWU was instigated by UDIPAS splintering from KUCFAW and 
the merger between UDIPAS and KEGAWU. Intermediation capabilities exercised by the 
KNPSWU leadership, all of whom were guards, was necessary to initiate dialogue with the 
former KEGAWU and UDIPAS officials. The main achievement was reaching some ideological 
common ground of building a strong and cohesive KNPSWU. The intermediation strategy 
emphasized the fact that, despite differences in individual interest and demands, all the officials 
needed to promote union stability and cohesiveness in the union leadership. This represented one 
of the surest methods to avoid problems associated with path dependence in the union.  
 




Four key strategies were used to achieve unity and cohesion in the union leadership. One was to 
integrate eligible former KEGAWU and UDIPAS officials into the leadership of KNPSWU 
through elections. The second strategy was to offer some of the officials who could not vie for 
elective posts due to the new constitutional restriction full time employment opportunities in the 
union. This, however, came at a price for the union in terms of paying the officials in question 
relatively higher salaries than the ordinary secretariat. The third strategy was to empower the 
union officials and assign them specific roles for enhanced accountability. To facilitate effective 
performance of the officials and efficient delivery of services, the union put in place a strong 
secretariat to provide technical assistance to both the union officers and the officials-turned-staff. 
The secretariat, totaling 36 staff members, consists of qualified lawyers, industrial relations 
specialists, economists and accountants. Finally, the articulation capability is exercised by the 
general secretary of the union who is also the head of the secretariat by ensuring multi-level 
interaction and understanding between and among the union officials and staff.  
 
In conclusion, KNPSWU was able to significantly activate its associational power through a 
process of internal restructuring that increased not only the efficiency of the organization but also 
membership participation and control at all levels of union representation. Security guards felt 
that it was them owning the union and they got actively involved in the union’s activities, 
inclusive of membership organization and recruitment. This provided the impetus for the union 
to grow significantly in a short space of time. The union leadership was furthermore able to build 
unity and cohesion within the union by integrating the former officials of the defunct private 
security industry unions into its leadership and secretariat.  
 
Gaining and strategically utilizing institutional power  
Institutional power is the result of struggles and negotiation processes based on structural power 
and associational power. It exists in situations where authority has been socially approved and 
accepted as legitimate. Institutional power is, therefore, the capacity of workers and/or their trade 
union to influence the behavior of an employer by invoking the formal or informal rules that 
structure their relationships and interactions. It includes lobbying, invoking terms of an existing 
legal framework, and leveraging the informal relationship between management and a union or 
works council.  
 
The KNPSWU was able to win institutional power through stratification of the private security 
industry; entering into framework agreements for recognition and negotiation of collective 
bargaining agreements; lobbying and advocating for establishment of institutions, which had 
regulatory and social dialogue mandates; and involving trade union actors at the supranational 
level.  
 
Stratification of the industry and negotiation of framework agreements 
The KNPSWU stratified the private security industry as part of the strategy for effective 
membership organization and recruitment targeting. The stratification was a simple process 
conducted internally by the union officials and secretariat. The stratification process relied  on 
the experience of the union officials and followed the organizational boundaries of the private 




security industry associations.19 The strategy in this stratification was twofold: one to negotiate 
and sign a framework recognition agreement with the formal private security firms through their 
industry associations; and two, to negotiate a full CBA with the association that represents the 
large firms and a partial CBA that only guarantees payment of at least statutory minimum wages 
with the industry association that represents the medium and small private security firms.  
 
The union’s strategy first targeted the private security companies organized under the Kenya 
Security Industry Association (KSIA). This was due to the perceived receptiveness and 
sensitivity to workers’ issues by the KSIA members, relative to firms who are members of the 
Protective Security Industry Association (PSIA). The union posits that majority of the employers 
in PSIA are militant, arrogant and have anti-union tendencies. According to the union, majority 
of the members of PSIA also engage in unfair labour practices, which undermine enjoyment of 
the fundamental principles and rights at work by the guards.  
 
The entry point for the union was to negotiate a framework recognition agreement with KSIA to 
cover all the companies under the association. The importance of the framework recognition 
agreement is that once entered into, the KNPSWU does not have to negotiate and sign 
recognition agreements with the individual KSIA member companies before initiating 
negotiations towards concluding a CBA. Secondly, the recognition agreement mandates the 
union to negotiate a single CBA with the KSIA, which then is applied to all the 30 members of 
the association. In respect of institutional power, the agreement grants the union access to all the 
KSIA members. This means that the union can plan and conduct its membership organization, 
recruitment campaigns, and other trade union development activities with any of the members of 
the KSIA without undue resistance.   
 
The strategy to organize and sign a framework recognition agreement with the KSIA was 
executed between 2011 and 2016, and realized with the signing of a recognition agreement on 6th 
July 2016. The agreement covers all the 30 companies under the association. The second notable 
success was the initiation of collective bargaining process by the parties. The inaugural 
negotiation meeting was held in November 2016 and a follow up one in December 2016 with the 
agreement being at the final stages of conclusion.  
 
The KNPSWU’s focus for membership organization and recruitment through stratification 
strategy shifted to PSIA with effect from September 2016. An initial notable success of the effort 
is that one of the companies in the association, Lavington Security Ltd, started implementing a 
check-off with the union. This is a positive sign, since implementation of a check-off is first line 
step of recognition by an employer of the right of a union to organize and undertake collective 
bargaining on behalf of its members.     
 
In all these efforts, the union sustained pressure through a multi-pronged lobbying approach 
targeting the government, parliamentarians, the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the 
Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE), which the KSIA and PSIA are members of. However, 
                                                             
19 There are two private security industry associations. The Kenya Security Industry Association (KSIA) mainly covers large 
private security firms. The association had a total of 30 members as of 2016. The Protective Security Industry Association (PSIA) 
mainly organizes medium and small private security firms. It had a total of 80 members as of 2016.  




the successes did not, come without a cost to the union. The process of membership recruitment 
and agitation for recognition was long and difficult, especially given that the employers were 
initially hostile to the union representatives. Consequently, a considerable number of shop 
stewards lost their jobs; others were demoted; and some were redeployed in areas considered 
operationally difficult. Between January and March 2015, for example, close to 200 guards had 
been sacked for joining the union. Interviews with the General Secretary of the union (in January 
2017) revealed that the union absorbed a few of the sacked shop stewards into its secretariat, and 
continues to pay nominal stipend to support the others who could not be employed by the union. 
This action, at least, gave some hope to the other union organizers, shop stewards and rank-and-
file employees.   
 
Establishment of the protective and security services wages council 
The KNPSWU successfully lobbied for the establishment of the Protective and Security Services 
Wages Council (Republic of Kenya, 2013). In so doing, the KNPSWU increased its leverage by 
winning the support of industry players such as the KSIA, PSIA, FKE, and Central Organization 
of Trade Unions (COTU (K). The KNPSWU was able to articulate to the KSIA and PSIA 
members that establishment of the council would be beneficial to them given the heterogeneous 
and segmented nature of the private security industry market. The KNPSWU considered that 
though KSIA and PSIA are operating in the same market, the clients targeted have different 
tastes and preferences as well as different willingness and ability to pay for the services offered 
by the private security industry companies.  
 
The KNPSWU advanced the argument that the private security industry market has three distinct 
segments. The first segment is that of high-end clients such as High Commissions, Embassies, 
United Nations (UN) and international Organizations. The second segment consists of 
Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies; and commercial banks. According to the 
union, the third segment of the private security industry market consists of the commercial and 
industrial organizations, residential estates and individual clients in residential homes. The three 
segments of the market have different willingness and abilities to pay. According to the union, 
establishing a standard statutory minimum wage and other terms and conditions of employment 
to be enforced on all firms is not equitable both to employees and industry employers.  
 
The union, therefore, advocated for segmentation of the market into the three bands and 
establishment of statutory minimum terms and conditions of employment based on the bands. 
Research work associated with this would involve mapping of firms that have clients in the 
respective bands and negotiating pay and benefits, which reflect the conditions within them. This 
strategy was supported by all the tripartite partners, including the industry associations: the KSIA 
and PSIA. This position was adopted and is being discussed by the Protective and Security 
Services Wages Council. The Council has had several meetings but are yet to undertake the 
mapping survey and clustering due to financial constraints. The direct benefit of the market 
segmentation and clustering of firms is that it will help establish standard rates of pay based on 
market segment. It will also help reduce undercutting by firms.  
 
The KNPSWU also used its intermediating capabilities to successfully lobby government to 
make it mandatory for public procurement entities in Kenya to obtain a certificate of attestation 




from the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MoL&SP) confirming adherence to and 
compliance with statutory minimum terms and conditions of employment before being awarded 
any service contract. The KNPSWU, KSIA and PSIA all acknowledge that the private security 
industry is highly competitive. They also underscore the fact that there is a lot of business under-
cutting in the industry, in which firms tend to bid down their fees in order to win service tenders. 
The ultimate losers, however, are the workers whose wages and other terms and conditions of 
employment would be the first targets for cutting. The union, therefore, came up with the 
strategy to address the under-cutting, ensure compliance with the statutory terms and conditions 
of employment, and protect the welfare of workers. This strategy was adopted and is being 
enforced by the MoL&SP. The only challenge is how to extend and enforce it on the private 
sector entities and informal sector firms who do not procure their contracts from public 
institutions. 
 
Other forms of institutional power used by the KNPSWU is negotiating framework agreements, 
namely recognition agreements and CBAs. In Kenya, recognition agreements are used as 
instruments that guarantee the union the right and legitimacy to represent employees in question 
in any negotiations regarding their terms and conditions of employment. This, therefore, is a step 
towards ensuring that the rights of workers are protected and their welfare is improved.  
 
The union, for example, negotiated a CBA with KK Security Ltd in respect to employees of the 
company posted at the Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi. The KK Security 
Ltd is a multinational company with over 23,000 across East and Central Africa. The CBA 
between KNPSWU and KK Security Ltd raised the monthly salaries of the security guards at the 
Embassy of the United States of America in Nairobi by about 50 per cent. The conclusion and 
subsequent implementation of the CBA afforded the union much publicity and visibility. This 
helped in enhancing the confidence of the industry employees on the collective bargaining and 
representational ability of the union, and in terms of recruiting members.  
 
Lobbying for establishment of industry regulatory authority  
Another form of institutional power used by the KNPSWU to increase its influence was lobbying 
for the enactment of the Private Security Regulation Act (2016) and establishment of the Private 
Security Regulatory Authority. The KNPSWU is on record having mobilized guards to 
participate in a procession in 2013 to hand over The Private Security Bill to the speaker of the 
national assembly. In 2015 and supported by the ILO, the union organized a stakeholder 
consultative forum on the Bill. Industry players such as the PSIA, KSIA, FKE, COTU (K), 
MoL&SP, other relevant government ministries and departments, and stakeholders participated 
in the dialogue.  
 
The Private Security Regulation Act (2016) was assented to on 18th May 2016 and entered into 
law on 3rd June 2016. It provides for the regulation of the private security industry, and 
framework for cooperation with the national security organs. The enactment of this piece of 
legislation was an important gain for the KNPSWU. The Act seeks to organize or formalize the 
private security industry. Section 9(b) of the Act, for example, empowers the Private Security 
Regulatory Authority to formulate and enforce standards for the conduct of private security 




services in the country. Section 9(c) empowers the Authority to register and license all persons 
involved in or conducting private security services in the country.  
 
The implication is that with proper enforcement, all the private security firms will be registered 
and licensed at least after meeting some set criteria. It also follows that with the registration and 
licensing, the firms will at least be much more visible. The other gain from the registration and 
licensing is that the union can obtain a list of all private security providers to facilitate its 
mapping, especially for membership organization and recruitment, and collective bargaining 
activities. By being represented in the Authority, the union can also influence the standards to be 
developed and enforced to include the basic terms and conditions, and committing of service 
bonds to protect security guards against unexpected closure and/or relocation of private security 
firms. 
 
Involving trade union actors at supranational level 
Another institutional power resource used by the KNPSWU is involvement of trade union actors 
at the supranational level. McCullum (2013) argues that labour is an agent of global governance. 
The author avers that workers are not simply victims of global dynamics but can also change the 
rules of global engagement. In this case, the KNPSWU used institutional power from a different 
source by invoking formal and informal rules inherent in the Global Framework Agreement 
(GFA) signed between the Union Network International (UNI)20 and Group 4 Securicor (G4S) in 
2008. The KNPSWU is an affiliate of UNI while the G4S is a major employer of security guards 
in Kenya and Africa.  
 
The KNPSWU recognized that the GFA guaranteed new rules that allowed G4S employees to 
form and/or join trade unions without undue interference by the company management. It is, 
therefore, part of the institutional power strategy to expand the scope, bargaining power and 
influence of local unions. Specifically, the UNI/G4S framework agreement cover labour 
relations and employment standards. It also covers union rights such as freedom of association, 
union access and union recognition. 
 
To execute the institutional power, the KNPSWU approached (in 2013) the management of G4S 
in Kenya with a copy of the framework agreement and an introductory letter from UNI. It used 
this power resource to leverage its organizing plan at the company. It also used the GFA to 
expand its bargaining power by forcing the G4S to play by the union rules. In the words of the 
general secretary of the KNPSWU, “the union used the framework agreement to advance its 
interests in recruiting G4S employees into the union”. Specifically, the union utilized the 
agreement as a platform for gaining unfettered access to G4S employees, visiting the G4S guards 
across the country, holding union meetings, marketing the union agenda, and conducting union 
membership organization and recruitment campaigns. The union membership recruitment drive 
at the G4S was also boosted by a two-year grant given to the union and other affiliates of UNI to 
facilitate them with membership organization and recruitment of G4S workers.  
 
                                                             
20 UNI is a global union federation for skills and services, bringing together national and regional trade unions. It 
was launched as Union Network International on 1st January 2000. 




The KNPSWU acknowledges that the framework agreement contributed to the unrestricted 
access granted to it and the non-interference by the management of the G4S in the recruitment 
drive and related union activities. It also enabled both the union organizers to talk to the G4S 
employees without fear of management reprisal. The G4S guards also attended union 
membership recruitment campaign meetings and enlisted into the union membership without fear 
of victimization by the management. The KNPSWU’s membership organization and recruitment 
campaigns at the G4S through the GFA was successful because it helped to neutralize the anti-
union management of the G4S while simultaneously creating the conditions for workers to 
organize, and build internal union structures and networks (McCullum, 2013).  
 
The institutional power developed and utilized by the KNPSWU on G4S enabled it to recruit into 
the union 14,000 of the 16,000 employees of G4S in Kenya. This means that the union enlisted 
into its membership 87.5 per cent of the unionisable employees of the company.  In keeping with 
Section 54 of the Kenyan Labour Relations Act (No. 14 of 2007), the KNPSWU applied for 
recognition by the G4S. Section 54(1) of the Act require an employer or a group of employers to 
recognize a trade union for purposes of collective bargaining if the trade union represents a 
simple majority (50%+1) of the unionisable employees of the company or the group of 
employers. Consequently, the KNPSWU and G4S signed recognition agreement in 2013.   
 
The recognition agreement between the KNPSWU and G4S helped in making new rules in the 
company-governance struggles. The governance struggles achieved by the union enabled it to 
exercise much more power in the company, and gain much more access to the workers and the 
workplace. This means that the union was able to fill the governance gap in an environment 
where workers’ rights were not being recognized (McCullum, 2013). Thus, with the recognition 
agreement in place, the KNPSWU was now able to and indeed negotiated a CBA with the G4S. 
Overall, the gaining of access into the G4S by the KNPSWU and the subsequent recruitment of 
its employees, signing of recognition agreement and CBA gave the union substantial leverage in 
its mandate to secure, promote and protect the welfare of private security guards in Kenya.  
 
The foregoing discussions show that the KNPSWU was able to consolidate its grip by gaining 
and strategically utilizing institutional power to its advantage. The key strategies used were 
stratification of the industry, signing recognition and collective bargaining agreements, building 
the union’s lobbying and advocacy capacity, and involving trade union actors at the 
supranational level. The actions endeared the union, at least to the partners and union members, 
as a strong and focused workers’ organization. It also gave the union members some element of 
confidence on the representational ability of the union, including being a strong advocate for the 
protection and improvement of welfare of its members.     
 
Conclusion 
Two power resources, associational power and institutional power, are credited with the 
revitalization realized by the KNPSWU. Capabilities such as organizational flexibility, 
intermediation, articulation and organizational learning were particularly important in building 
union membership, strengthening internal cohesion and solidarity, and promoting unity amongst 
the union secretariat, rank-and-file members, shop stewards and national officials. In the context 
of the KNPSWU, it developed and utilized to its advantage institutional power arising from the 




framework agreement between UNI and G4S. The union utilized this power resource to fill the 
governance gap, sign recognition agreements, and enter into and conclude CBA with the G4S for 
the benefit of workers.  
 
Institutional power was mainly exercised through stratification of the private security industry; 
signing of framework agreements; and establishment of institutions to promote social dialogue 
and regulation of the industry. It was useful in reinforcing the benefits that accrued from 
utilization and exploitation of associational power resources, facilitating the establishment of a 
platform for provision of union products and services to members. Institutional power resources 
were also used to enhance the policy influencing ability of the union thereby endearing it as a 
strong, cohesive and vibrant union capable of turning challenges into opportunities.  
 
The development and utilization of the power resources at the KNPSWU revealed the double 
function of framing. Externally, it allowed the union to gain more sympathy and relevance from 
the members of the public. This contributed positively to the union’s lobbying and advocacy 
campaigns, including membership organization and recruitment. Internally, it presented the 
union with articulation capabilities to construct multi-level interaction and understanding 
between the national officials, shop stewards, and the rank-and-file members.  
 
List of Abbreviations 
CBA   Collective Bargaining Agreement 
COTU (K)  Central Organization of Trade Unions (Kenya) 
ELRC   Employment and Labour Relations Court 
FKE   Federation of Kenya Employers 
G4S   Group 4 Securicor 
KEGAWU  Kenya Guards and Allied Workers Union 
KNPSWU  Kenya National Private Security Workers’ Union 
KSIA   Kenya Security Industry Association 
KUCFAWU  Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied Workers  
MoL&SP  Ministry of Labour and Social Protection 
PSIA   Protective Security Industry Association 
UDIPAS  Union of Diplomatic International Private and Allied Security Officers   
UN   United Nations 
UNI   Union Network International  
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